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7.1  Introduction 
In most governmental and academic discussions about budgetary discipline, 
the budget deficit-or  the net financial balance-is  often cited as the key vari- 
able to control. Belgium is not different in that respect. Hence, in section 7.2, 
I present a brief review of Belgian fiscal policy from a debt-deficit point of 
view. This partial vision suggests that Belgian public finances are, overall, un- 
der control. 
My aim in this paper is to go beyond this and present generational accounts 
for Belgium. Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) have introduced gener- 
ational accounting as an alternative or at least a complement to the traditional 
measure of budget deficit. The data and conventions that are the basis for the 
generational accounts for Belgium are set up in the last part of section 7.2. 
The generational accounts themselves are presented in  section 7.3. Next, 
the estimate of the burden on future generations is computed. This estimate is 
compared to the “birth bill” that typical members of  future generations will 
have to face given the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Fi- 
nally, the conclusions of generational accounting about the burden imposed by 
old-age pensions will be compared to the results of other kinds of studies. 
In section 7.4, I examine the generational accounts for Belgium in terms of 
potential fiscal policy. Alternative policy measures are simulated and conclu- 
sions are drawn about the relative efficacy and political feasibility of the cor- 
responding fiscal instruments. I analyze in section 7.5 the influence of  the 
When this paper was written, Jean-Philippe Stijns was SSTC researcher at the University of 
Liige. 
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treatment  of  education  on  generational  accounts. Finally, in  section  7.6,  I 
summarize my findings and present some paths for further research. 
7.2  The Belgian Setting 
With a debt-to-GDP ratio around 128 percent in 1995, the issue of the need 
for budget discipline is obviously compelling in Belgium. Table 7.1 summa- 
rizes the evolution of the Belgian government budget from the mid-1980s up to 
1995. Some substantial efforts have in fact already been accomplished. Indeed, 
during the  1980s, the Belgian government net financial balance fell by more 
than half as a share of GDP, decreasing from 13 percent in the early 1980s to 
roughly 5.7 percent in 1990, From 1991 until 1993, however, the net financial 
balance deteriorated and went back up to 7.5 percent of GDP. Since 1994, the 
net financial balance has been decreasing again.’ 
The first objective of  Belgian  budgetary  policy  is currently to meet the 
Maastricht Treaty criteria. Accordingly, in 1992, the government set targets for 
the gradual mitigation of the government deficit to 3 percent of GDP in 1996 
(compared to 7 percent in 1992). In fact, this pace of deficit reduction is com- 
parable to that observed in the 1980s. The second objective is to eliminate the 
risk of a “snowball effect,” that is, a self-sustaining increase in the debt-to- 
GDP ratio as a result of interest payments. The third is to create in the long run 
a sufficient degree of freedom for public finances to confront the problems of 
population aging. 
In practice, the plan introduces three guidelines: the welfare system is to be 
in equilibrium, fiscal receipts must have “unit elasticity” (increase in line with 
GDP), and primary expenditure must not increase in real terms. A supplemen- 
tary rule consists in keeping the primary surplus above 6 percent of GDP be- 
yond 1996, with a view to bringing up a “countersnowball” effect. 
Since 1992, in order to compensate for the negative incidence of unforeseen 
macroeconomic shocks, the government has implemented a series of structural 
corrective measures. According to the National Bank of Belgium (1995), these 
additional measures implied budget reductions of 1 percent in 1992, 2.5 per- 
cent in  1993, and  1.75 percent  in  1994. Also, approximately 60 percent of 
these are due to new direct and indirect taxes and to a lesser extent to increased 
payroll taxes, 30 percent result from cutbacks in expenditures, and 10 percent 
stem from other sources, including asset auctions. Indeed, the Belgian primary 
surplus in percent of GDP is clearly high (5 percent vs. -0.7  percent for the 
European Union). This reflects the high level of taxes: compared to the EU 
average, direct and payroll taxes are 5.5 percent higher whereas primary expen- 
ditures, at 42.7 percent, are only slightly higher. 
In 1994, the snowball effect seems to have practically stopped: the debt-to- 
GDP ratio has slightly decreased below 128 percent. Nevertheless, with a debt- 
to-GDP ratio twice the EU average, interest payments relative to GDP were 
I. See also Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1995). Table 7.1  General Government Budget (percent of GDP) 
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46.3  46.2  46.9 
16.7  16.6  16.6 
12.2  12.2  12.5 
15.3  15.5  15.7 
42.5  42.6  43.5 
24.7  25.0  25.4 
8.7  8.8  9.1 
5.2  5.4  5.4 
3.0  3.0  3.1 
17.8  17.6  18.1 
3.7  3.7  3.4 
10.3  10.9  10.9 
























5  .O 
9.1 
-4.1 
Debt-GDP ratioc  117.5  121.7  122.1  119.4  119.3  120.2  122.0  128.2  127.6  127.9 
Source: National Bank of Belgium: author's computations.  I am grateful to Mr. Modart of the Department of  General Statistics of the National Bank of Belgium for 
these data. 
"Including  pensions of public sector employees. 
bIncluding  early retirement and career interruptions. 
cTbe value for 1995 is based on an estimate of the National Bank of Belgium (1996). 164  Jean-Philippe Stijns 
Table 7.2  Transfer and Tax Taxonomy 









Social security contributions 
Wealth taxes 
Indirect taxes 
“‘Child care” corresponds to public spending relative to child care institutions 
bEducational spending has been attributed to students. This does not exactly reflect the private 
benefits of education, but it surely is a better assumption than including it in nonspecific govern- 
ment consumption. See Ablett (1996);  see also section 7.5. 
still twice as high as the EU average (10.1 percent vs. 5.3 percent in 1994). In 
1995, lower interest rates induced lower interest payments. This resulted in an 
improvement of  the net financial balance (-4.1  percent of GDP in  1995 vs. 
-5.2  percent in  1994). 
In terms of  trend, whereas the primary surplus and the global deficit of the 
European Union have both been relatively stable for a decade, these two budget 
indicators have improved in Belgium, and the global deficit has tended to get 
closer to the European average. This reading  of  the situation suggests that 
simple commitment to the current fiscal policy could be enough to return to 
a reasonable debt-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, according to the National Bank of 
Belgium (1  996), even  under  a relatively  conservative macroeconomic sce- 
nario,2  the budget would be in surplus by the beginning of the next century. By 
2020, the debt-to-GDP ratio would fall below 60 percent. 
This paper will contrast these conjectures with the results of  generational 
accounting. Table 7.2 provides the taxonomy of  transfers and taxes used  in 
this paper. I distinguish between seven kinds of transfers, which I derive from 
Lambrecht, Fasquelle, and Weemaes (1994). Note that a part of public expen- 
diture is treated as pseudotransfers. Taxes are estimated using aggregate results 
of  the Belgian Households Budget Survey (Institut National de Statistique 
1994). Income data comes from the Caisse Gknirale d‘Epargne et des Retraite 
(1988). Belgian national accounts are used for 1995. For purposes of compar- 
ability across  countries, all  results are expressed in  equivalent U.S.  1995 
d011~~.3 
7.3  The Generational Accounts 
Let me select reasonable, though arbitrary, values for the interest and growth 
rates. I assume a 6 percent real interest rate and a 0.75 percent real growth rate. 
2. A 2 percent real growth rate, a little less than 5 percent in nominal terms, and an effective 
3. I use indicative exchange rates (daily means) of the National Bank of Belgium for this pur- 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, i.e., the mean rate over the past decade. 
pose. In 1995 the daily mean exchange rate was 29.5  l Belgian francs per U.S.  dollar. 165  Generational Accounts for Belgium 
Table 7.3  Generational  Accounts (thousands of 1995 US.  dollars) 
1988  1995 
Generation’s  Net  TaX  Transfer  Net  Tax  Transfer 
Age in  Payments  Payments  Receipts  Payments  Payments  Receipts 
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In table 7.3, the Belgian generational accounts are presented for 1988 and 1995 
according to this baseline scenario. This scenario corresponds to a lower bound 
for intergenerational inequity in  1988. Results under alternative assumptions 
will also be presented. 
Columns (2) and (3) show the current values of taxes and transfers, respec- 
tively, that the representative member of each age group faces in 198f14  Col- 
umn (1) subtracts columns (3) from column (2) and thus displays the current 
value of the net taxes each member of every age group faces over her or his 
remaining lifetime (negative numbers indicate net transfer  receipt^).^ In other 
words, column (1) shows the generational account of the representative mem- 
ber of each generation in 1988. Columns (4),  (5),  and (6) provide the same in- 
formation for 1995. 
As expected, most active people in the year of reference are facing the heavi- 
est burden. Indeed, in the year of reference, they face the highest taxes of their 
lifetimes, whereas they have already received young-age transfers (education, 
etc.). Young individuals will have to face the same net taxes later. Hence, their 
present value is less than the discounted value of those paid by the active. On 
4. In this paper, women and men are not distinguished. 
5. Note that I am  not considering taxes that have already been paid and transfers that have 
already been received prior to 1988 and 1995, respectively. 166  Jean-Philippe Stijns 
the other hand, people over age 53 (54) in 1988 (1995) can expect more trans- 
fers than taxes. Further, an 85-year-old awaits lower net transfers than does a 
70-year-old. Indeed, the former will receive less since he or she has already 
received most of his or her old-age pension transfers. 
Imbalance among generational accounts cannot be used as an indicator of in- 
tergenerational inequity among existing generations. This does not mean, how- 
ever, that some degree of  intergenerational inequity may not prevail. Indeed, 
Clokeur and Perelman (1994) find that the transfer-tax ratio has fallen from 99 
percent for a citizen born in 1920 to 59 percent for a citizen born in 1980.6 
Hence, an interesting question is whether this imbalance among current living 
generations has worsened in recent years. Figure 7.1 plots in parallel Belgian 
generational accounts for 1988 and 1995. Generational accounts for 1988 have 
been adjusted to take account of  GDP growth between the two years of  ref- 
erence. 
Once GDP growth has been accounted for, both younger and older living 
generations appear to have been favored by policy changes between the two 
years of reference. People under age 53 are facing lower net taxes, and citizens 
above this age can expect higher net transfers. Despite the fact that the primary 
surplus has increased over the 1988-95  period, this result should not be sur- 
prising. Indeed, transfers to households as a share of GDP have been growing 
faster than total tax receipts (see table 7.1). From  1988 to 1995, transfers to 
households grew by 0.6 percent of GDP, whereas tax receipts increased only 
by 0.3 percent of GDP. 
Finally, the higher the discount rate, the lower the absolute value of genera- 
tional accounts. Younger generations receive most transfers in the short run, 
whereas the bulk of their taxes is located in the future and thus discounted 
proportionally to the interest rate. For older generations who will mainly ben- 
efit from transfers, the higher the interest rate, the lower the present value of 
future transfers. The lower the growth rate, the higher the absolute value of 
generational  accounts. The influence of  the growth rate is straightforward: 
transfers and taxes are assumed to grow at this rate. 
Let me turn to the level of net public wealth to be considered. This is not a 
trivial issue. Auerbach et al. (1994) have considered federal net wealth to be 
roughly equal to minus the sum of the national income account deficits from 
1900 through  1991. On the other hand, Ablett (1996) considers two extreme 
hypotheses regarding Australian net public wealth in order to analyze sensitiv- 
ity of results to net wealth estimation. First, as a lower bound, net wealth is 
defined as minus government (net) debt; second, an upper bound is computed 
as the value of government capital from the Australian national accounts minus 
government (net) debt. Auerbach et al. (1994) argue that it is not important to 
measure existing public capital since its value is offset by  imputed rents in 
6. The transfer-tax ratio is defined as the ratio of the life cycle sum of transfers to the life cycle 
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Fig. 7.1  “Adjusted” generational accounts, 1988 versus 1995 
public consumption. In fact, Belgium is one of the rare countries where a com- 
prehensive inventory of public assets and liabilities has been undertaken (see 
Commission pour l’hventaire 1990, 1995). I follow Auerbach et d.’s approach 
insofar as I take into account public liabilities net of only financial assets yield- 
ing returns. 
From 1988 to 1995, gross public liabilities have increased from 136 percent 
of  GDP to 141 percent of GDP. Gross financial assets yielding returns went 
down from 46 percent of GDP to 25 percent of GDP. Hence, net public liabili- 
ties increased from 89 percent of GDP in 1988 to 116 percent of GDP in 1995. 
Net public liabilities are, of  course, the mirror image of  net public wealth. I 
tend to use the former term in the rest of this paper, as net public wealth turns 
out, as usual, to be negative. Non-(age)-specific government consumption is 
estimated to be approximately equal to 16 percent of GDP in 1988 versus 15 
percent of GDP in 1995, based on Belgian current accounts.’ 
Table 7.3 provides per capita figures. The present value of net contributions 
of  living generations is in fact needed. In table 7.4, each transfer and tax per 
capita has been multiplied by the corresponding generation size over time. The 
7. Non-(age)-specific government consumption is government consumption less the amount 
corresponding to transfers and pseudotransfers (education, etc.) that are taken into account in 
generational accounts. 168  Jean-Philippe Stijns 
Table 7.4  Present Value of Net Taxes of Current Living Generations (billions of 
1995 U.S. dollars) 
Transfer or Tax 
1988  1995 
Percent  Percent 
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first rows give estimates of transfers; following rows concern taxes. The last 
row shows that in present value the sum of net taxes of current living genera- 
tions has risen; however, as a share of GDP, the present value of net taxes of 
current living generations has declined by 29 percentage points. 
To compute the burden on future generations, net public liabilities, nonspe- 
cific government consumption, and the sum of net transfers to current living 
generations have to be combined. Table 7.5 shows that in 1988, future genera- 
tions would have to have to have paid back a bill equivalent to 48 percent of 
GDP in order to meet the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. 
In 1995, this figure had risen to 74 percent of GDP. 
The sum of net transfers is strongly negative and outweighs nonspecific con- 
sumption. This indicates that a heavy net fiscal burden has already been placed 
on current living generations (and particularly on younger ones). On the other 
hand, the change in the burden on future generations is quite striking. As a 
share of GDP, it has risen by 26 percent. This is due to the decrease in net taxes 
and the growth in net public liabilities as a share of GDP. Belgian budgetary 
efforts are reflected in the decrease of nonspecific government consumption as 
a share of GDP. This observation illustrates that budget equilibrium may be a 
necessary condition for budgetary soundness but cannot be considered a suffi- 
cient condition. 
Finally, I turn to the equivalent of this burden in terms of the “birth bill” to be 
paid by each member of future generations, assuming that members of future 
generations pay  a constant net tax adjusted for growth. Table 7.6 compares 169  Generational Accounts for Belgium 
Table 7.5  Present Value of the Burden on Future Generations (billions of 1995 
U.S. dollars) 
1988  1995 
Percent  Percent 
Total  of GDP  Total  of GDP 
Sum of net transfers  -71 1.96  -378  -936.66  -  349 
Net public liabilities  168.72  89  377.38  116 
Nonspecific consumption  633.68  336  823.82  307 
Burden on future generations  90.41  48  264.54  74 
~ 
Table 7.6  Newborn versus Future Generations (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
~~~~ 
1988  1995 
Total future burden  90,410,000  198,480,000 
Equivalent “birth bill”  40.72  89.49 
Newborn generational account  32.02  43.26 
Percentage difference  27  1  07 
Table 7.7  Percentage Difference for 1988 under Alternative Assumptions 
Real Growth (%) 
Real Interest 
Rate (%)  0.50  0.75  1  .oo  1.25  1.50  1.75  2.00 
~~ 
3  41  43  45  47  50  127  131 
4  35  37  38  40  41  43  45 
5  30  31  33  34  36  37  39 
6  27  27  28  29  30  32  33 
7  34  30  28  27  27  27  28 
newborns’ generational account with future generations’ birth bill in the base- 
line scenario. The percentage difference is 27 percent in 1988 and reaches 107 
percent in 1995. 
As table 7.7 shows, the baseline assumptions correspond to a lower bound 
for the 1988 percentage difference.8  Results range in fact from 27 to 131 per- 
cent. The latter figure is reached with a 3 percent discount rate and a 2.0 per- 
cent growth rate. 
In table 7.8, I present results for 1995 under alternative assumptions. Results 
now range from 61 percent (vs. 27 percent in  1988) to  235 percent (vs. 131 
percent in  1988). Failure to face the intertemporal government budget con- 
straint between  1988 and  1995 has the consequence that future generations 
8. Baseline assumptions are a 6 percent real interest rate and a 0.75 percent real growth rate. 170  Jean-Philippe Stijns 
Table 7.8  Percentage Difference for 1995 under Alternative Assumptions 
Real Growth (%) 
Real Interest 
Rate (%)  0.50  0.75  1  .oo  1.25  1  SO  1.75  2.00 
3  61  61  61  62  64  67  71 
4  66  64  63  61  61  61  61 
5  82  77  72  69  66  64  62 
6  121  107  96  88  81  76  72 
7  235  190  158  135  118  105  94 
Table 7.9  Present Value of Gross Burdens (billions of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
Transfer 
1988  1995 
Percent  Percent 
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Gross public liabilities 
Nonspecific consumption 













































now face a minimum 61 percent increase in their lifetime net taxes as compared 
to  1995 newborn~.~  A 61 percent change in net tax rates is in fact already an 
unsustainable figure. As future generations will probably keep receiving some 
form of  transfers, their gross tax rates will have to be raised by much more 
than 61 percent. 
In a nutshell, a considerable effort has to be made as soon as possible. In- 
deed, under the baseline scenario, an 80 percent increase has been observed in 
the ratio of the net fiscal burden of future versus present generations over a 
period of  only seven years. At this pace, Belgium will reach the twenty-first 
century with an unsustainable net fiscal burden to impose to its citizens. 
Table 7.9 weighs  gross burdens in  1988 and  1995 (i.e., public transfers, 
gross public liabilities, and nonspecific consumption) against GDP. First, old- 
age pensions come up quite expectably with the highest relative weight: 368 
9. The reader should keep in mind that the consumer/worker is not expected to react in any way 
to tax increases in this model. If that were the case. the net tax rate would have to be raised further. 171  Generational Accounts for Belgium 
percent of  GDP in  1988 and 399 percent of  GDP in 1995. Health care pro- 
grams correspond to 170 percent of  GDP in  1988 and 195 percent in  1995. 
Other transfers are more reasonable. It is noteworthy that in the two years, both 
old-age pensions and health care transfers to existing generations outweigh not 
only net but also gross public liabilities. 
Nonspecific consumption also represents a very important burden, with 336 
percent of  GDP in 1988 and 307 percent in 1995. It should be noticed that 
though nonspecific consumption is projected ad infinitum, it is still outbal- 
anced in current value by old-age pension transfers to current living genera- 
tions. 
The OECD (1994) has found gross pension liabilities to amount to 57 1 per- 
cent of GDP in 1990. The difference between my estimates for both years and 
that of the OECD comes most likely from the fact that I have assumed old-age 
pensions follow the economic growth rate. However, were the current rules for 
pension computation to be respected, this transfer would grow faster than the 
rest of the Belgian economy.1o  My observations and those of the OECD (1994) 
lead to the common conclusion that pension rights definitely outweigh all other 
kinds of liabilities the government will have to face." 
Second, old-age pensions and health care transfers have  grown to higher 
shares of GDP between 1988 and 1995, whereas the rest of the transfers have 
been rather stable as shares of  GDP. Third, the heavier the weight on future 
generations a transfer imposes, the faster it grows as a share of GDP. 
I conclude that strict discipline over the net financial balance will guarantee 
neither the sustainability nor the generational equity of the current fiscal sys- 
tem.I2 The only way  to reach another conclusion is to arbitrarily impose the 
condition that social security (taken broadly) be in equilibrium over time. 
7.4  Economic Policy Implications 
What change in one of the transfer and tax flows would be required to obtain 
a 1:  1 ratio of future to newborn generational accounts? Table 7.10 summarizes 
my findings for 1988 and 1995. For each of  the instrument variables, that is, 
taxes and transfers, columns (1) and (2) give the rates of change in the tax or 
10. This is the case mostly because female workers will increasingly obtain complete career 
pensions instead of receiving household pensions together with their husbands. Another reason 
behind this is that the pension system is increasingly coming to maturity: social security receipts 
are computed with an increasing number of working years accounted for proportionally rather 
than as a lump sum. 
11. Two  other different kinds of  studies are also worth mentioning. Callatay and Turtelboom 
(1996) have also reviewed the financial implications of aging for the pension system in Belgium. 
They estimate that if all net liabilities (except those of the self-employed) were financed through 
debt from  1995 to 2050, the stock of  new pension debt would be around 260 percent of  GDP 
in 2050. Bouillot and Perelman (1994) found that under their reference scenario, pension rights 
accumulated proportionally to a worker's career would grow from 292.5 percent of GDP to 388.8 
percent from 1987 to 2040. 
12. See Kotlikoff (1988, 1992) for a systematic illustration of this. 172  Jean-Philippe Stijns 
Table 7.10  Solving Values for “Generational Equity” (thousands of 1995 
U.S. dollars) 
Transfer or Tax 
Percentage Change  Birth Bill 
1988  1995  1988  1995 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Old-age pensions  -3  -9  32.26  44.42 
Health care  -5  -  17  33.07  48.60 
Unemployment benefits  -  16  -57  33.05  48.63 
Education  -  12  -45  36.26  65.77 
Indirect taxes  +4  +  12  33.38  50.31 
Social security contributions  +2  +8  33.05  48.60 
Wealth taxes  +31  +119  33.21  49.35 
Direct taxes  +3  +  10  33.02  48.46 
transfer value, per member of each age group, with 1988 and 1995 as years of 
reference. Hence, this policy simulation assumes that members of  each age 
group see the value of this particular tax (transfer) increased (decreased), per 
capita, by the reported percentage. 
Columns (3) and (4) give the new values of the newborn generational ac- 
count, with  1988 and 1995 as years of reference. This value is by  definition 
equal to the birth bill of future generations. Though all the fiscal instruments 
are able to solve for generational equity, they do not leave newborn and future 
generations equally well off. Consequently, one natural way of evaluating the 
relative advantages of each instrument is to rank them according to the size of 
the generational account with which they leave the newborn and future genera- 
tions. This is appropriate since it is known from section 7.3 that young genera- 
tions are already facing important generational accounts. 
Old-age pensions score first according to this criterion. Then follow direct 
taxes. In 1995, solving for the Auerbach et al. (1991) criterion for generational 
equity with old-age pensions (direct taxes) would leave newborn and future 
generations with a $44,420 ($48,460) generational account. In comparison, 
recall that  in  case of  no  change in  fiscal policy the generational accounts 
amount to $43,260 for the newborns and $89,490 for future generations. I con- 
clude that both instruments are able to solve for generational equity; that is, 
they can keep future generations’ situation no worse than the newborns’ while 
putting a limited additional strain on young generations. The case for direct 
taxes can be questioned since generational accounting does not take into ac- 
count the potential reaction of economic agents to tax changes. 
These two potential policy proposals would seem to be easier than others to 
implement politically. Indeed, they require a relatively reasonable 9 to 10 per- 
cent reduction (increase) in old-age pension transfers (direct taxes). However, 
to be effective, this change would have to be adopted immediately and com- 
pletely from 1995 onward. One could of course choose a balanced combination 173  Generational Accounts for Belgium 
Table 7.11  Solving Values for “Generational  Equity” with a Ten-Year Burden 
Rollover until 2005 (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
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-81 
-  75 
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+11 
+  170 









of these two instruments. Health care reductions would also leave young gener- 
ations with reasonable generational accounts. However, health care cuts would 
have to be of considerable magnitude, that is, 17 percent. In any case, this in- 
strument could perhaps represent a useful complement to pensions and direct 
taxes. All other programs leave the newborn and future generations with high 
generational accounts or would represent very high proportional increases (de- 
creases) in taxes (transfers) per member of each age group. 
It is worth noting that the ranking of the instruments on either criterion has 
hardly changed over time. Yet the increase in magnitude of required fiscal pol- 
icy changes is considerable. For pension receipt cuts, the required change has 
increased from 3 to 9 percent. The change is from 3 to 10 percent for income 
tax changes. Thus “wait and see” policies are not conceivable. The data in table 
7.11 help to support this claim. 
Table  7.11 assumes that the burden on future generations from table 7.5 
is rolled on until 2005. In other words, from 1996 until 2005 (inclusive), the 
annual budget constraint is met, after which, needed policy changes are imple- 
mented in order to face the government intertemporal budget constraint. As for 
old-age pension receipt cuts, the required change has increased from 9 to 13 
percent. The change is from 10 to 14 percent for income tax changes. 
The reader should bear in mind that these increases are solely due to a failure 
to cope with the government intertemporal constraint and not to a failure to 
present a balanced budget. Put differently, this simulation assumes a zero net 
financial balance. Furthermore, the above-mentioned policy changes have been 
derived under the baseline assumptions, which are far from the most pessi- 
mistic. 
7.5  The Treatment of Education 
Finally, I deal with the assumption of educational spending as a transfer to 
students. Ablett (1996) suggests that this is a better rule than assuming that 
education is a pure public good. Table  7.12 illustrates the influence of  this 174  Jean-Philippe  Stijns 
Table 7.12  Generational  Accounts in 1995 under Different ’keatments of 
Education (thousands of 1995 U.S. dollars) 
Generation’s Age  Education as  Education Included in 
































-  130.56 
-  165.69 
-  172.37 
-  163.74 
-  153.08 














-  130.56 
-  165.69 
-  172.37 
-  163.74 
-  153.08 
-  138.64 
-  118.96 
choice on Belgian generational accounts in 1995 under the baseline assump- 
tions. 
First, young generations end up with lower generational accounts when edu- 
cational spending is attributed to students as a pseudotransfer. Second, the 
baseline percentage change between future generations’ “birth bills” and new- 
borns’ generational account decreases from 107 to 58 percent when failing to 
attribute education to specific age groups. In my view, the treatment of educa- 
tion as part of non-age-specific government consumption tends to seriously 
understate intergenerational inequities. 
7.6  Conclusions 
The analysis in section 7.2 suggests that since 1992 Belgium has been taking 
steps in the right direction. However, the results of  section 7.3 dampen any 
optimism. Indeed, future generations will have to face a minimum 61 percent 
increase in their net taxes as compared to the newborn generation in 1995. This 
indicator ranges up to 235 percent if growth and interest rate assumptions vary 
from the baseline. Under the baseline scenario, an 80 percent increase in the 
ratio of  the net fiscal burden  of future versus present  generations has been 
observed over only seven years. At this pace, Belgium will reach the twenty- 
first century with an unsustainable net fiscal burden to impose on its citizens. 175  Generational Accounts for Belgium 
Old-age pensions and health care transfers come in first place as determi- 
nants. Strict discipline over the net financial balance will guarantee neither the 
sustainability nor the generational equity of the current fiscal system. In terms 
of economic policy, reforming old-age pensions and direct taxes would allow 
equilibrium to be restored between future and newborn generations while leav- 
ing them with the lowest generational accounts to cope with. Again, required 
tax increases and transfer cuts have been increasing substantially from 1988 to 
1995. The same conclusion holds if needed policy changes are to be imple- 
mented with  some delay. Quick fiscal policy  change is therefore absolutely 
necessary. 
Finally, three complementary paths for further research could be followed. 
First, it would be interesting to distinguish between lifetime income categories 
in order to simultaneously analyze intru- versus intergenerational issues. Sec- 
ond, it would be worthwhile to link Belgian generational accounts with a gen- 
eral equilibrium model for Be1gi~rn.I~  This would endogenize some parameters 
used here and would allow an assessment of generational equity issues in terms 
of utility. Third, alternative scenarios as regards the evolution of  transfer re- 
ceipts per age group could be contrasted with the assumptions of generational 
accounting.  I  conjecture that such a modeling of consumer behavior  and of 
transfer receipts may well call for even larger transfer cuts and tax increases. 
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